![]() 1979) (Blance II), we noted that, on retrial after the remand in Blance I, the very same documentary evidence found insufficient in the first trial was again relied on by Blance. From the record before us, we hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff has failed to establish any interest in the land described in his complaint which would entitle him to recover in this action. We explained that theĪilure to carry the burden of proof regarding title to the land effectively negates any right to determination of the boundary line. 1975) (Blance I), we vacated a judgment resolving a boundary dispute in favor of Blance's husband, and remanded to the Superior Court, concluding that although Blance had admitted evidence to establish the location of a disputed boundary line, he did not sufficiently prove his title to the land. The courts "must not be clogged by repetitious presentations of identical issues." Mottram v. The doctrine "serves the critical policies of judicial economy, the stability of final judgments, and fairness to litigants." Salenius v. Res judicata applies even though "the second suit relies on a legal theory not advanced in the first case, seeks different relief than that sought in the first case, or involves evidence different from the evidence relevant to the first case." Id. ![]() Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 635 A.2d 956, 959 (Me.1993) (quoting Currier v. The "measure of a `cause of action' is the `aggregate of connected operative facts that can be handled together conveniently for purposes of trial,'" Petit v. Town of Hudson, 665 A.2d at 678 (citations omitted). The doctrine of res judicata bars "the relitigation of issues that were tried, or that may have been tried, between the same parties or their privies `in an earlier suit on the same cause of action.'" Wozneak v. When no factual issues exist in determining the res judicata effect of an earlier action, we review "the court's application of the doctrine for errors of law." Wozneak v. In reviewing an appeal from an order granting a motion for a summary judgment, we view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered to determine whether the record supports the trial court's conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Simpson v. The court concluded that res judicata barred Blance's claims because the new legal theory arose from the same aggregate of operative facts as did the prior claims that Blance had filed against Alley and that Blance could have brought the adverse possession action in the prior suits. After a hearing, on May 9, 1996, the court entered a summary judgment for Alley on Blance's complaint. After removing the case to the Superior Court, both parties subsequently filed cross-motions for a summary judgment. In this suit, Blance alleges that she and her late husband had acquired title to the property by adverse possession as a result of holding the property for forty or more years in the required manner. *829 On April 5, 1994, Blance filed a quiet title action against Alley and others regarding a parcel of land in Gouldsboro. We are unpersuaded by her contentions and affirm the judgment. In the alternative, she contends that a summary judgment should not have been entered against her even if the same cause of action is stated. On appeal, Blance contends that res judicata does not apply because a different cause of action is present in this case. Nellie Blance appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) concluding that her claim of title by adverse possession was barred by res judicata. Giunta (orally), Ellsworht, for defendant.īefore ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and LIPEZ, JJ. ![]() Weeks (orally), Norton & Weeks, Bangor, for plaintiff.Īnthony J. ![]()
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